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1. INTRODUCTION
When a creditor wins a judgment against a foreign government,
the creditor's task does not end. The sovereign and diplomatic immu-
nity of foreign governments may make it difficult or impossible to exe-
cute the judgment against the state's property. In theory, a creditor
should be able to execute a judgment against state property used for
commercial purposes, but not for property used for sovereign or diplo-
matic purposes. In practice, the distinction may not be clear. If the only
available property is a bank account in the name of the embassy, the
creditor is at a distinct disadvantage in trying to prove that the account
is used for commercial purposes and thus subject to execution.
One United States district court recently held that, when an em-
bassy bank account is used for "mixed" commercial and non-commer-
cial purposes, the burden is on the party attempting execution to show
that the "essential character" of the account is non-commercial before
execution is allowed.1 Because the embassy's diplomatic immunity se-
verely restricts discovery concerning the use of the embassy account,
this holding makes it all but impossible for a creditor to execute a judg-
ment on such an account without the consent of the foreign
government. 2
Section 1 of this Comment will explore the problem of executing
judgments against such "mixed" embassy bank accounts and will pro-
* J.D. Candidate 1989, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., 1986,
Middlebury College.
1 Liberian E. Timber Corp. v. Gov't. of Republic of Liberia, 659 F. Supp. 606,
608 (D.D.C. 1987) [hereinafter LETCO]. See infra text accompanying notes 102-09.
2 See infra text accompanying note 157.
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pose a new approach to the treatment of sovereign and diplomatic im-
munity in this area. Section 2 will explain the development of sovereign
and diplomatic immunity in the United States. Section 3 will show how
the United States has applied these principles to execution on embassy
bank accounts, where these two doctrines overlap. Section 4 will pro-
pose a new standard for such execution which will better reflect both
the sovereign and diplomatic principles at stake.
2. SOVEREIGN AND DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY DISTINGUISHED
Sovereign and diplomatic immunity can both prevent an otherwise
valid suit from proceeding when a foreign government or its agent is
the defendant. The two doctrines are, however, distinct in their mean-
ing, purpose and application.
Sovereign immunity is "a doctrine of international law under
which domestic courts, in appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over
a foreign state."3 This rule is based on the proposition that all states
are equal as sovereigns,4 and it has been subject to an increasing num-
ber of exceptions. In particular, this doctrine becomes confused when
an arm of the state, rather than the state itself, tries to claim immu-
nity.' Courts have historically given foreign states two independent im-
munities under this principle: immunity from the jurisdiction of the
court and immunity from execution of state property on an otherwise
valid judgment.8
A foreign state can waive its sovereign immunity, but the stan-
dards for such waiver differ from country to country. In the United
States, this waiver can be expressly stated in a contract,7 generally
stated in a treaty,8 or can be assumed from surrounding circumstances,
such as submission to the jurisdiction of a court.9 Most countries hold
I H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606.
" The term can also be applied to a state's immunity from suits brought by its
own citizens, not addressed in this Comment, because "the king can do no wrong." See,
e.g., JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, at 151-52
(1972). By combining the doctrines that "the king can do no wrong" and "all states are
equal as sovereigns," it thus follows that a state cannot be sued in its own courts nor in
a foreign court without its consent.
5 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 46-64.
A clause in the contract agreeing to arbitration would constitute such a waiver.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 446(2)(b) (1988) [hereianfter RESTATEMENT].
" See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, 1957, United
States-Netherlands, art. XVIII(2), 8 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942, 285 U.N.T.S.
231.
9 This can take place either before or after the suit arises. RESTATEMENT, supra
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that the sovereign loses its jurisdictional immunity when the sovereign
"descends from the throne" and engages in commercial activity. 0 In
certain cases, a waiver of jurisdictional immunity implies a waiver of
executional immunity, while in other cases it does not. 2
Diplomatic immunity is based on the exchange of embassies be-
tween countries and generally means that diplomats can be subject
neither to criminal suit nor to most kinds of civil suits w ithout the con-
sent of the foreign sovereign." This immunity attaches to such diplo-
matic personnel and property as an embassy." ' Diplomatic immunity
therefore precludes execution on most types of diplomatic property.15
Some countries consider embassy bank accounts diplomatic property, at
least when the accounts are used for diplomatic purposes. 6
Sovereign immunity in the United States is governed by treaties,"7
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 8 and common
law.19 Diplomatic immunity is based on the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations20 and common law.2 '
2.1. Sovereign Immunity
Sovereign immunity began as an absolute doctrine in the United
States,22 as it did in most countries. A foreign sovereign could not be
sued nor its property executed upon in the United States under any
circumstances.23 United States courts historically deferred the decision
whether or not to grant sovereign immunity to a foreign government
note 7, at § 446(2)(a).
'0 See infra text accompanying notes 79-129 for a discussion of the "commercial
activities" exception.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 446(2)(b)(ii).
12 Id. at §§ 456(1)(b).
11 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 31, 23 U.S.T.
3230, 3240, T.I.A.S. No. 7502 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
1' Its purpose, however, is not to benefit individuals. Id., Preamble, 23 U.S.T. at
3230.
15 Id. art. 22, 23 U.S.T. at 3237-38.
16 E.g., LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1987).
17 See, e.g., Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States
and Nationals of Other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090,
575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter Investment Convention].
a 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1982).
19 See, e.g., MacArthur Area Citizens Assoc., v. Republic of Peru, 809 F.2d 918,
920 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
20 Vienna Convention, supra note 13.
, See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, John Doe #700, 817 F.2d 1108 (4th
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, Marcos v. United States, 484 U.S. 890 (1987).
22 Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812).
23 Id.
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entity24 in individual cases to the United States Department of State.25
In 1956, the State Department issued the Tate Letter,26 which
stated that claims against foreign governments arising out of political
acts (jure imperii) were entitled to jurisdictional immunity, while those
arising out of the sovereign's commercial activities (jure gestionis) were
not entitled to such immunity.2" Much of the world already employed
this doctrine2 8 However, a state's right to have its property immune
from the execution of a valid judgment (executional immunity) was not
addressed in the Tate Letter.2 For the next quarter century, the State
Department and the courts generally clung to the view that a state
could assert immunity from execution on that property used for its
commercial acts.30
24 The foreign government itself is not the only entity that can claim immunity
under the doctrine. Often, a state instrumentality can claim immunity as well.
The [FSIA] draws a sharp distinction for purposes of post-judgment at-
tachment and execution between the property of states and the property of
state instrumentalities: 1) the property of states may be attached only if it
is or was used in commercial activity; the property of state instrumentali-
ties may be attached without any such limitation, so long as the instru-
mentality itself is engaged in commercial activity in the United States; and
2) the property of states may be attached only when it is related to the
claim that gave rise to the judgment; no such limitation applies to judg-
ments against state instrumentalities based on claims
under. . .§1605(a)(2),(3), & (5) of FSIA. These distinctions stem from
the conception that state instrumentalities that engage in commercial activ-
ities are by definition akin to commercial enterprises, so that their immu-
nity is exceptional and limited, whereas the primary function of states is
government so that their liability (including amenability to post-judgment
attachment) is limited (absent waiver) to particular claims and particular
property.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 7, at § 450 comment (b).
25 Jack B. Tate, Counsel to the State Department, states in a letter to Attorney
General Phillip Perlman,
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control the
courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea of sover-
eign immunity where the executive has declined to do so. There have been
indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme Courts feel that in
this matter courts should follow the branch of government charged with
the responsibility for the conduct of foreign relations.
Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign
Governments, DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 984, 985 (1952) .
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 984-85. Note, however, that the whole world does not follow the restric-
tive doctrine even today. See infra notes 113-25 and accompanying text.
29 Id. at 984 (The question at issue in the letter was "[w]hether the practice of the
Government in granting immunity from suit to foreign governments made parties de-
fendant in the Courts of the United States should not be changed?" [emphasis added]).
" Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 21 Misc.2d 1086, 1090, 192 N.Y.S. 2d
469, 473 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1959); H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6626. Comment, Sovereign
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The United States Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, in an at-
tempt, inter alia, to reduce the State Department's role in the determi-
nation of sovereign immunities."1 The statute left the court some lati-
tude in determining immunity under the Act."2 One of the four major
goals of the statute was to make the executional immunity rules more
closely parallel the jurisdictional immunity rules and to give the judg-
ment creditor a remedy if the foreign government did not pay a valid
judgment."3 The FSIA thus listed a single definition of "commercial
activity" for the exceptions to both jurisdictional immunity and to im-
munity from execution."' The Act did not address diplomatic
Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1090
(1965).
Si H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6610.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6608. The other three
stated goals are: 1) to codify the restrictive theory of diplomatic immunity; 2) to ensure
that the restrictive theory is applied in the United States courts, and 3) to provide a
statutory procedure for serving process and establishing jurisdiction over a foreign state.
Id. at 7-8, 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605-06.
a' The full definition is:
A 'commercial activity' means either a regular course of commercial con-
duct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial char-
acter of an activity shall be determined by reference to the nature of the
course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference
to its purpose.
28 U.S.C. § 1603 (d). The jurisdictional immunity exception for commercial activity
reads:
(a)A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case
• . .(2)in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on
in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the
United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state
elsewhere . . . and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1605. The commercial activity exception from executional immunity is
more complicated. It reads:
(a)The property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from attach-
ment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a
court of the United States or of a state . . . if-
(1) [the foreign state has explicitly or implicitly waived its executional
immunity], or
(2) the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon which the
claim is based, or
(3) [the property was taken in violation of international law, the property
was acquired by succession or gift or liability insurance was involved].
(b) In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of an
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial activity
in the United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execu-
tion, or from execution, upon a judgment . . . if-
19881
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immunity.3 5
United States courts, however, still do not follow the restrictive
doctrine regarding execution on embassy bank accounts to the same ex-
tent that they apply the restrictive doctrine to jurisdictional immunity.3 6
Also, the courts permit execution on other state property more freely
than on embassy accounts. One reason for these differences in treat-
ment is that diplomatic immunity often prevents execution on embassy
bank accounts. Courts have looked to the wording of the Vienna Con-
vention and concluded that affording "full facilities" to a foreign em-
bassy must include protecting its embassy bank accounts from execu-
tion."1 As will be shown below, however, international law does not
necessitate this result."' This Comment proposes a standard that is con-
sistent with generally accepted international law without prohibiting
execution on all such accounts. 9
Several treaties suggest that executional immunity should gener-
ally be governed by domestic law, while jurisdictional immunity should
be more responsive to international law.4" For instance, the Convention
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals
of Other States,4" to which the United States is a party, established a
means for international arbitration through a central commission.42 It
specifically stated, however, that "[ejxecution of the award shall be gov-
erned by the laws concerning the execution of judgments in force in the
State in whose territories such execution is sought."43
(1) [the foreign state explicitly or implicitly waived its executional immu-
nity], or
(2) the judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality
is not immune [because of the commercial activity exception for jurisdic-
tional immunity, rights were taken in violation of international law, cer-
tain torts were committed or a maritime lien is being enforced].
28 U.S.C. § 1610.
31 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6606.
30 See infra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
37 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D.D.C. 1987). This was the actual holding of
the LETCO court. The court noted that "Congress did not intend the FSIA to affect
diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention," because the FSIA was not explic-
itly made subject to existing international agreements." Id. n. 3.
35 See infra notes 113-142 and accompanying text.
3" See infra notes 149-169 and accompanying text.
40 This approach parallels that taken by the federalist legal system of the United
States, whereby the execution even of a judgment entered under federal law is, gener-
ally, governed by state law.
41 Investment Convention, supra note 17.
42 Id. art. 1, 17 U.S.T. at 1273, 575 U.N.T.S. at 12.
43 Id. art. 54(3), 17 U.S.T. at 1292, 575 U.N.T.S. at 194. LETCO involves a
judgment under this treaty. See infra note 93.
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One commentator suggested that a court proceeding leading to a
judgment does not have to affect the foreign state, while execution of a
judgment does, because a state need not appear and defend itself in a
particular action."' Therefore, executional rules can be more narrowly
drawn than jurisdictional immunity rules. Where the executional im-
munity rules are not clear, however, it may be a great risk to the state
not to defend an action in court. 5
2.2. The Restrictive Immunity Doctrine
2.2.1. History
United States courts have traditionally given an expansive reading
to the commercial jurisdictional immunity exception, and the FSIA has
expanded that reading even further. Prior to the passage of the FSIA,
the restrictive immunity in this area was governed by the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' decision in Victory Transport v. Comisaria
General.4" The court held that, in the absence of State Department
guidance, "we are disposed to deny a claim of sovereign immunity...
unless it is plain that the activity in question falls within one of the
categories of strictly political or public acts about which sovereigns have
traditionally been quite sensitive."'41 If one of these activities is in ques-
tion, the foreign state is entitled to immunity. The purpose of the activ-
ity is determinative.
The FSIA, however, merely looks to the nature of the act to decide
if a classification scheme is "commercial" or not and in this manner
" Fox, Enforcement Jurisdiction, Foreign State Property and Diplomatic Immu-
nity, 34 Ilr'L & COMP. L.Q. 115, 123 (1985).
"' The risk is that the state may subject itself to a default judgment.
46 Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964).
47 Id. at 360. The court went on to say:
such acts are generally limited to the following categories:
(1) internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien.
(2) legislative acts, such as nationalization.
(3) acts concerning the armed forces.
(4) acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(5) public loans.
We do not think that the restrictive theory adopted by the State Depart-
ment requires sacrificing the interests of private litigants to international
comity in other than these limited categories. Should diplomacy require
enlargement of these categories, the State Department can file a suggestion
of immunity with the court. Should diplomacy require contraction of these
categories, the State Department can issue a new or clarifying
pronouncement.
1988]
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rejects this "purpose" test."8 The statute says that if a commercial activ-
ity is in question, the foreign sovereign is not entitled to immunity.
Activity that is both commercial and sovereign would therefore not be
entitled to immunity. 9 Thus, as to those acts that have both public
purposes and commercial means, the FSIA is a dramatic shift toward
non-immunity.
2.2.2. The "Commercial Activity" Exception to Jurisdictional Immu-
nity
The test adopted by the FSIA to determine whether an act is sov-
ereign or commercial is whether or not a private person could engage in
the activity.5" If a private person could engage in the activity, then the
act must be considered commercial.5" If a private person is unable to
engage in the activity, then it must be a sovereign act.52
This distinction, however, still gives courts much latitude in inter-
pretation. A court's decision to define the particular transaction or act
broadly or narrowly can determine whether the "act" is sovereign or
commercial. For instance, an act of hiring governmental employees can
be seen as the "hiring of employees," an activity which a private person
could engage in, or as the "employment of diplomatic, civil service or
48 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d). See also, Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immuni-
ties Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 53 (1978). Von Mehren offers
examples of the workings of this difference.
[Under the Victory Transport scheme] any act 'concerning the armed
forces' and any 'public loans' are 'political and public' acts because of their
purpose while 'legislative acts' are such because of their nature . . . Fi-
nally, if it is accepted that what is 'commercial' cannot be 'political and
public,' it must be concluded that Congress specifically rejected the judicial
classification of Victory Transport. It clearly said that acts concerning the
armed forces. . .and public loans, two of the five judicial categories of
public acts delineated by Victory Transport, were not public but commer-
cial acts. However, there is no logical necessity for making the categories
of 'commercial acts' and 'political and public acts' mutually exclusive.
Thus, in adopting the 'commercial act' standard for non-immunity cou-
pled with the nature test for defining commercial acts, it would seem that
Congress intended to provide for jurisdiction with respect to all commer-
cial acts by foreign sovereigns, even if those acts were 'political and public
acts' within the Victory Transport classification.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
See supra note 34, where the definition of "commercial activity" under the act is
spelled out.
4' 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610.
11 H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6615. This test applies to a single act, as distinguished
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military personnel," which is strictly a governmental activity.5 3 United
States courts have looked to the legislative intent of the FSIA and the
specific facts of each case in determining whether or not to accord sov-
ereign immunity to such acts.
54
In International Association of Machinists v. Organization of Pe-
troleum Exporting Countries (OPEC),55 a district court allowed juris-
dictional sovereign immunity concerning the price fixing and output
limitations of the state-owned oil companies of OPEC. The court said
that even though the defendant nations were engaged in commercial
activities through partial or total ownership of these oil companies,
"this does not mean, and the legislative intent [of the FSIA] does not
support the conclusion that all activities, even those remotely connected
with these companies, are necessarily commercial. 56 The court found
that the pricing agreement was a sovereign act of marketing the wealth
and natural resources of a nation. 57
In other areas, however, United States courts have given a broad
reading to the commercial activities exception to jurisdictional immu-
nity. For example, when the United States and the Soviet Union en-
tered into a cultural exchange agreement, a United States district court
determined that contracts entered into pursuant to that agreement with
promoters were "commercial" because they involved the sale of a ser-
vice.58 Their overall purpose of fulfilling the exchange agreement was
not determinative. 9 Apparently, the court placed the burden on the
foreign state to prove that the commercial activity exception did not
53 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp.
553,567 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981).
" 477 F. Supp. at 566-67.
:5 Id. at 567.
' Id. at 568 n.14. The court also posed the following hypothetical:
The fact that a nation owns and operates an airline company does not
mean that all government activities regulating the use of airspace, or the
ingress and egress of airplanes to and from the nation's airports, are com-
mercial activities. Accordingly, we must look to the specific activities in
which the defendants engage.
Id.
57
From the evidence presented to this court, it is clear that the nature of the
activity engaged in by each of these OPEC member countries is the estab-
lishment by a sovereign state of the terms and conditions for the removal
of a prime natural resource - to wit, crude oil - from its territory.
Id. at 567. The court noted that its decision was based primarily on the "specific facts"
of the case and partially on the legislative intent of the FSIA, "to keep our courts away
from those areas that touch very closely upon the sensitive nerves of foreign countries."
Id.
58 United Euram v. U.S.S.R., 461 F. Supp. 609, 611 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9 Id.
1988]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
apply. 0 In Gibbons v. Udaras -na Gaeltachta, a governmental scheme
that allowed investors to take advantage of certain existing tax laws
was considered "purely commercial." 6
Even in the context of embassies, United States courts have read
the commercial activity exception to jurisdictional immunity broadly. In
Transamerican Steamship v. Somali Democratic Republic (SDR),62 a
government agent used an embassy as a conduit for settling a dispute
with a merchant.6 3 A United States district court held that, although
the embassy could be viewed as protecting its government's interests,
"its conduct exceeded the bounds of ordinary diplomatic behavior." '64
2.2.3. The "Commercial Activity" Exception and Executional
Immunity
The FSIA does distinguish between immunity from jurisdiction
and immunity from execution.65 Yet the legislative history of the FSIA
suggests that there was considerable support in international law for a
restrictive approach to executional immunity even when the United
States, through the suggestion of the State Department, still followed
the absolute immunity approach. 6 For example, state-owned ships
80 See id. at 610, 611 (defendants' motion for dismissal on grounds of immunity
denied because defendants failed to show that the statutory "commercial activity" ex-
ception did not apply to them).
81 Gibbons v. Udaras na Gaeltachta, 549 F.Supp. 1094, 1110 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1982). The court said that it
need not decide the difficult question of the jurisdictional result that would
flow from a mixed commercial non-commercial activity such as would
have existed here if GE, instead of being an entity designed to enable
potential investors to take advantage of certain favorable Irish tax laws,
had been given its own de facto law-making power in order to offer pro-
spective investors special tax incentives as part of GE's contribution to a
joint venture.
Id.
82 Transamerican Steamship v. Somali Democratic Republic, 767 F.2d 998 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
63 Pending the resolution of this essentially private dispute, the shipowner placed
money in the embassy's bank account in order to release its ship from attachment. Id.
at 1000-01.
Id. at 1003 ("Taken together, SDR's activities were essentially those of a col-
lection agent, acting on behalf of its principal, the Agency, to wrest funds from an
unwilling payor - and not that of a foreign sovereign diplomatically attempting to
maintain friendly relations.")
8" Also note that the FSIA eliminated the ability (and most of the necessity) of a
creditor to attach foreign state property as a means of obtaining jurisdiction. § 1610
only carves out exceptions to the general principle of executional immunity, not for pre-
judgment attachment.
Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982) (immunity of a foreign state from jurisdiction) with
§ 1609 (immunity from attachment and execution).
86 A number of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation concluded
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could often be executed upon when the ships were engaged in commer-
cial activities."' However, those same treaties have often simultaneously
limited the possibility of execution to those debts that the ship itself had
incurred.68
Congress, in passing the FSIA, decided to "partially [lower] the
barrier of immunity from execution, so as to make this immunity con-
form more closely with the provisions on jurisdictional immunity in the
bill." 9 Courts have held, in actions under the FSIA, that wholly-
owned "subsidiaries" of a government are not responsible for the debts
of their government,7 0 unless the failure to hold them responsible would
perpetrate a fraud. 1 This lowering of the barriers, however, has not
reached the embassy bank account context.
2.3. Diplomatic Immunity
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations" is often cited
as a justification for granting embassy bank accounts diplomatic immu-
nity from execution, even when jurisdictional immunity has been
waived." In this area, however, the Convention is vaguely worded and
subject to several possible interpretations. Article 25 of the Convention
merely states that the state receiving an embassy "shall accord full fa-
cilities for the performance of the functions of the mission."
There is some support in the Convention for distinguishing be-
tween the jurisdictional and executional immunity of a diplomatic
by the United States permit execution of judgments against foreign pub-
licly owned or controlled enterprises (for example, Treaty with Japan,
April 2, 1953, art. 18(2), 4 U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863). The widely
ratified Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating
to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, April 10, 1926, 196 L.N.T.S.
199, allows execution of judgments against public vessels engaged in com-
mercial services in the same way as against privately-owned vessels.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6626.
67 Id.
"s See, e.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29,
1958, art. 20.2, 15 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 218.
("The coastal state may not levy execution against or arrest the ship for the purpose of
any civil proceedings, save only in respect of obligations or liabilities assumed or in-
curred by the ship itself in the course or for the purpose of its voyage through the
waters of the Coastal State.")
" H.R. Rep. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 27, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6626.
70 See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984).
71 See First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba,
462 U.S. 611, 629 (1983).
7' Supra note 13.
7' LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606, 608 (D.D.C. 1987); Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of
Colombia, [19841 App. Cas. 580, 597-98.
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agent.74 There is even support for exempting the ambassador's personal
bank account, as opposed to the government's embassy account, from
execution." There is not, however, such specificity in the area of state-
owned money.76 Nevertheless, both British 7  and United States78 courts
have decided that the Convention exempts embassy accounts from
execution.
3. PRESENT TREATMENT OF "MIXED" EMBASSY BANK ACCOUNTS
3.1. United States Treatment
In 1980, the District Court for the District of Columbia held, in
"' Article 31 of the Convention states that a diplomatic agent cannot be subjected
to measures of execution, except in cases of immovable property, wills, or "an action
relating to a professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the
receiving State and outside his official functions" and provided that the measures of
execution can be taken without infringing the inviolability of his person or of his
residence.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 31. The commentaries to the proposed article
(then article 24(3)) state:
The third exception arises in the case of proceedings relating to a profes-
sional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent outside his
official functions. If the diplomatic agent engages in such an activity, those
with whom he has had dealings in so doing cannot be deprived of their
remedy at law.
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, 2 INT'L L. COMM. Y.B. 131, 139
(1957)[hereinafter Report of the Commission].
7' Article 30 of the Convention states:
1. The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same invio-
lability and protection as the premises of the mission. 2. His papers, corre-
spondence and, except as provided in paragraph 3 of Article 31, his prop-
erty, shall likewise enjoy inviolability.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 30. The commentary to that section when pro-
posed (as Section 23) stated:
As regards movable property, the inviolability primarily refers to goods in
the diplomatic agent's private residence; but it also covers other property
such as his motor car, his bank account, and other goods which are for his
personal use, or essential to his livelihood.
Report of the Commission, supra note 74, at 139 [emphasis added].
" The nearest relevant provision is art. 22(3) which states, "The premises of the
mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the
mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution." Vienna
Convention, supra note 13, art. 22(3).
'7 Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, [1984] App. Cas. 580, 597-98. The court
said of Article 25:
Transposed into its negative form: neither the executive nor legal branch
of government in the receiving State - and enforcement of judgments of
courts of law is a combined operation of both these branches - must act in
such manner as to obstruct the mission in carrying out its functions.
Vienna Convention, supra note 13, art. 25.
7 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606, 611 (D.D.C. 1987).
[Vol. 10:4
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol10/iss4/6
JUDGMENTS AGAINST EMBASSY ACCOUNTS
Birch Shipping v. Embassy of United Republic of Tanzania,9 that an
embassy account "used to pay the salaries of the staff, [or to] pay for
incidental purchases and services necessary to the operation of the em-
bassy," had neither a public nor governmental character."s The ambas-
sador's affidavit called these uses "incidental purchases of goods and
services necessary and incident to the operation of the embassy."8"
The district court, however, reasoned that Congress intended that
the definition of "commercial activity" in the FSIA would include such
uses. The court found specific support for this proposition in the legis-
lative history of the FSIA. s' Because the account was used for commer-
cial activity, the court said that "[tihe only significant question [was]
whether it is proper to attach an account which is not used solely for
commercial activity."8 3 The court thought that granting the defendant
immunity would create a loophole, allowing such an account to be
made immune simply "by using it, at one time or another, for a minor
public purpose."84 Thus, any of the country's funds could be placed in
the embassy account and be exempted from execution. Further, the
government of Tanzania had expressly agreed in the disputed contract
to arbitration and to execution of any award.8 5
In 1987, the same court overturned its prior decision, and, in Libe-
rian Eastern Timber Corp. [LETCO] v. Government of the Republic
of Liberia,8" held that a similar embassy bank account which an am-
bassador claimed was used, inter alia, for "payment of salaries and
wages of diplomatic personnel and various ongoing expenses incurred
7' Birch Shipping v. Embassy of United Republic of Tanzania, 507 F. Supp. 311
(D.D.C. 1980).
80 Id. at 312.
8' Id. at 312 (emphasis omitted).
82 Id. The court pointed to the parts of the legislative history which specifically
included "the employment of American citizens or third country nationals by the for-
eign state in the United States[,] ... [a foreign government's] leasing of property, [and]
its employment or engagement of laborers, clerical staff or public relations or marketing
agents" in the definition of "commercial activity." Id. at 312-13 (citing H.R. REP. No.
1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
6604, 6615).
83 Id. at 313.
84 Id.
" Id. at 312. The arbitration agreement in Birch stated: "We further agree that
we will faithfully observe this Agreement and the Rules and that we will abide by and
perform any Award rendered pursuant to this Agreement and that a judgment of the
Court having jurisdiction may be entered upon the Award." Id. (quoting Parties' Sub-
mission to Arbitration, at 3). The court stated that "while an agreement to entry of
judgment reinforces any waiver, an agreement to arbitrate, standing alone, is sufficient
to implicitly waive immunity, as was recognized by Congress." Id. (citing H.R. REP.
No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, 28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 6604, 6617, 6627).
86 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C. 1987).
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in connection with diplomatic and consular activities"" was immune
from execution.
The court first held that under the Vienna Convention, official
bank accounts used for the premises of the mission were inviolable be-
cause of diplomatic immunity."8 As noted above, this finding is neither
required by the wording of the Convention nor by its history. 9
The court, however, also stated that the accounts could enjoy sov-
ereign immunity under the FSIA.90 Though conceding that some of the
embassy's activities would be "commercial," "the court decline[d] to or-
der that if any portion of a bank account is used for a commercial
activity then the entire account loses its immunity."'" Instead, it held
that "funds used for commercial activities which are 'incidental' or
'auxiliary,' not denoting the essential character of the use of the funds
in question," would not create an exception to the general rule of im-
munity from execution.92 The court made this finding despite the fact
that the Liberian government had agreed to an arbitration scheme that
included a waiver of immunity from execution.
93
The "incidental" or "auxiliary" provisions test developed from
two United States Court of Appeals decisions concerning jurisdictional
immunity which were decided between the district court's decisions in
Birch and LETCO. The LETCO court cited the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of
Nigeria" for the proposition that courts have difficulty determining
87 Id. at 610.
88 Although no provision of the Vienna Convention states specifically that
official bank accounts used or intended to be used for purposes of the dip-
lomatic mission enjoy diplomatic immunity from attachment, the Court
concludes that not affording diplomatic immunity to the Embassy's bank
accounts, despite the absence of such a specific provision, is inconsistent
with both the agreement set forth in Article 25 [requiring the receiving
state to accord the sending state "full facilities" for the performance of its
mission] and the intention of the parties to the Vienna Convention.
Id. at 608. The court seems to have deduced this conclusion from the fact that under
the Convention immovable property, archives, and documents are immune wherever
they may be. Id. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text (discussing immunity
under the Vienna Convention).
89 See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
80 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 608.
91 Id. at 610.
92 Id.
" Id. at 609. The D.C. District Court action deferred on this issue to the finding
of the District Court Southern District of New York in Liberian Eastern Timber Corp.
v. Gov't of the Republic of Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 76-77 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). LETCO,
659 F. Supp. at 76. The District Court for the Southern District of New York stated
that the dispute should be subject to arbitration according to the terms of the Invest-
ment Convention, supra note 17.
94 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
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whether or not funds are public or commercial in nature.95 The Texas
Trading court had observed, however, that in making the distinction
courts can look to the legislative history of the FSIA, the body of case
law which existed in United States law upon passage of the FSIA, and
to current standards of international law."' The court then held that a
state which had engaged in a massive international cement purchase
program, the ultimate purpose of which may have been sovereign activ-
ity, was not entitled to jurisdictional immunity.9"
The LETCO court also cited the opinion of the District of Colum-
bia Circuit Court of Appeals in Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of
Bolivia98 for the proposition that "incidental" or "auxiliary" commer-
cial aspects of an activity would not destroy the sovereign jurisdictional
immunity of the entire activity.99 In Practical Concepts, a foreign gov-
ernment had contracted with a private consulting enterprise to design
and implement a program for the ultimate sovereign goal of developing
the country's rural areas.'00 The contract's subsidiary provisions in-
cluded exempting the company from taxes and expediting the clearance
of supplies through customs.' 0 ' The court nevertheless found that the
contract's central feature was the provision of a service, a commercial
activity, and declined to extend jurisdictional immunity to Bolivia.'0 2
In this way the Court of Appeals indicated that it would not allow
a foreign government to gain immunity from jurisdiction by tying es-
sentially commercial contracts to an overall sovereign goal or mixing in
some provisions that are sovereign in nature. The district court in
LETCO, however, adopted the opposite view in the executional immu-
nity context and allowed "some portion"' 03 of the funds of an exempt
embassy bank account to be used for commercial activities which the
FSIA specifically states would fall under an executional immunity
exception.
LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610 (citing Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 308-10).
9 Texas Trading, 647 F. 2d at 309-10.
17 See id. at 302-03 (summarizing finding of no sovereign immunity for nation
defending against allegations of breach of contract for purchase of cement, "a commod-
ity crucial to the construction of Nigeria's infrastructure"). The court found that the
program qualified under the FSIA as "commercial activity," id. at 310, having a "di-
rect effect on the United States," id. at 311-13, and that a constitutional basis existed
for the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction over Nigeria. Id. at 313-15.
98 811 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
" LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610.
100 Practical Concepts, 811 F.2d at 1545.
101 Id. at 1549-50.
102 Id. at 1550.
los LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610. It is unclear from the opinion what portion of
the funds were used for that activity, and the court believed it would cause the embassy
hardship to find out.
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The LETCO approach thus contravenes the essence of the Practi-
cal Concepts holding. Practical Concepts demonstrates that an overall
sovereign goal need not always take precedence over the commercial
features of an activity, despite the government's claims concerning the
essential sovereign character of that activity. LETCO, on the other
hand, leaves an almost irrebuttable presumption that because a bank
account is held in the name of the embassy and an ambassador alleges
that the account has diplomatic goals, the account is immune.104
The different factual nature of the Birch and LETCO cases, how-
ever, may have led to the extraordinarily different results. In Birch, the
underlying dispute involved a contract for corn which the United States
Department of Agriculture had funded.10 5 The parties agreed to submit
their dispute to arbitration and agreed that a court judgment could be
entered upon any arbitration award.10 6 The arbitration panel awarded
plaintiff shipowner $89,168.56."'7 It is difficult to imagine that an
award of this size would bankrupt an embassy.
In LETCO, the plaintiff was a French corporation suing the Libe-
rian government for a timber concession in Liberia. The dispute had no
connection to the United States aside from the location of the embassy
account.10 8 An international arbitration panel claimed jurisdiction by
virtue of a quasi-arbitration treaty' 0 9 that Liberia, France and the
United States had signed, and the panel granted LETCO a judgment
of $9,076,857.25.10 Liberia disputed the jurisdiction of the arbitration
panel, but the treaty left the domestic court no other choice than to
accept the panel's determination of jurisdictional sovereign immu-
nity."' LETCO had previously attempted, unsuccessfully, to enforce
the arbitration award by attaching, among other assets, fees due the
government from owners of ships registered in Liberia."' The different
nature of these awards may have had a strong influence on the LETCO
court's view of sovereign immunity. As will be shown below, however,
the court did not need to make such a sweeping rule in order to allow
104 The presumption is practically irrebuttable due to the permissible level of dis-
covery against a foreign government. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
10' Birch, 507 F. Supp. at 311.
106 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
107 Birch, 507 F. Supp. at 311.
100 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 73, 74, 76 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
109 See supra note 93.
110 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 607.
See Investment Convention, supra note 17, art. 54, 17 U.S.T. at 1291, 575
U.N.T.S. at 194.
112 See LETCO v. Liberia, 650 F. Supp. 73, 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). The action in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, clearly, predates the action
in the District Court for the District of Columbia, and involves the attachment of dif-
ferent Liberian assets in the United States.
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immunity in LETCO."3
3.2. International Treatment of Embassy Bank Accounts
The rules of international law regarding sovereign immunity have
changed drastically in the last fifty years."" This revolution has caused
many countries to change their views concerning what types of activities
are exempt from legal process under this doctrine. Today, therefore,
some countries recognize more exceptions to immunity than others. For
instance, a survey by the United Nations in 1982 indicates that Bra-
zil,'1 5 Czechoslovakia, 16 Hungary,"' Sudan,"' Syria," 9 Trinidad and
Tobago,' 2" the Soviet Union,' and Venezuela 2 still cling to the prin-
ciple of absolute immunity of the sovereign from both jurisdiction and
execution. Furthermore, even those states that follow the theory of re-
strictive immunity use different categories of "restrictions."' 23 Thus, al-
though some judges claim to find support in international law for their
restrictive sovereign immunity principles in this area, 24 there is no
1 See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text.
114
In the last 50 years there has been a complete transformation in the func-
tions of a sovereign state. Nearly every country now engages in commer-
cial activities. It has its departments of state-or creates its own legal enti-
ties-which go into the market places of the world. They charter ships.
They buy commodities. They issue letters of credit. This transformation
has changed the rules of international law relating to sovereign immunity.
Trendtex Trading Corp. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, [1977] Q.B. 529, 555 (C.A.).
115 U.N. CODIFICATION Div. OF THE OFF. OF LEGAL AFF., MATERIALS ON JU-
RISDICTIONAL IMMUNITIES OF STATES AND THEIR PROPERTY at 562, U.N. Doc. ST/
LEG/SER.B/20, U.N. Sales No. E/F.81, V.10 (1982) [hereinafter United Nations
Materials].
118 Id. at 564.
a Id. at 576.
118 Id. at 601.
Ila Id. at 605.
120 Id. at 611.
121 Id. at 617.
122 Id. at 639.
I" For instance, West Germany phrases its distinction regarding immunity as one
of "public acts" versus "non-public acts," apparently looking to the purpose of the
activity, id. at 571, as does Spain, id. at 599. Egypt points to "commercial or sovereign
acts," id. at 569, while Mexico points to "trade activities." Id. at 584. These may seem
consistent; indeed, the distinction is such that, when posed the question, "[fln a dispute
relating to a contract of purchase of goods, would courts of your State be expected to
grant immunity to a foreign State which establishes that the ultimate object of the
contract was for a public purpose or the contract was concluded in the exercise of a
'public' or 'sovereign' function?" Ecuador responded, "Yes," id. at 568, while the
Netherlands responded "In principle, no." Id. at 588. Both countries purport to follow
the "restrictive" theory of immunity.
124 E.g., Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, [19841 App. Cas. 580, 597-98.
Judgment of Dec. 13, 1977, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, W. Ger., 46 Bundesverwal-
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consensus even on the broad concept of restrictive jurisdictional immu-
nity'25 enunciated in the Tate Letter. 2 '
In the United States, only one federal district court has determined
that a "mixed" bank account is usually immune from execution of a
valid judgment against the state.'2 7 The British House of Lords' 28 and
the West German Federal Constitutional Court12 have come to the
same conclusion. The British and West German decisions, however,
come from very different principles of the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity than the United States decision.
In the British case, Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia,'3 0 an
ambassador stated that the funds in his bank account were "not in use
nor intended for use for commercial purposes but only to meet the ex-
penditure necessarily incurred in the day to day running of the Diplo-
matic Mission."'' The House of Lords stated that despite the con-
clusory language in the affadavit, the burden of proof was thereafter on
the plaintiff to show that the account was almost entirely
commercial. 32
tungsgericht [BVerwG] 342 ed. and trans. in United Nations Materials, supra note
114, at 297 [hereinafter Philippine Embassy Case].
125 James Crawford has pointed out that the words "private," "commercial," and
"non-governmental" are often used to distinguish acts from "public," "non-commer-
cial," or "governmental," but in addition to the fact that there is no consensus on
which-if any-of these distinctions to use, none of these distinctions accurately reflects
the judicial decisions being handed down in international cases. He suggests scrapping
such broad categories and setting up more specific categories to be dealt with individu-
ally. Crawford, International Law and Foreign Sovereigns: Distinguishing Immune
Transactions, 54 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 75, 114 (1983). See also supra notes 126-142
and accompanying text.
12 Tate, supra note 25, at 984.
127 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610; see supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
128 Alcom Ltd. v. Republic of Colombia, [1984] App. Cas. 580, 604.
-"9 Philippine Embassy Case, supra note 124, at 318.
'30 [1984] App. Cas. 580.
131 Id. at 604.
132 Id.
Unless it can be shown by the judgment creditor who is seeking to attach
the credit balance by garnishee proceedings that the bank account was
earmarked by the foreign state solely (save for de minimus exceptions) for
being drawn upon to settle liabilities incurred in commercial transactions,
as for example by issuing documentary credits in payment of the price of
goods sold to the state, it cannot, in my view, be sensibly brought within
the crucial words of the exception for which section 13(4) provides.
Id. See also Note, Sovereign Immunity, 47 Mod. L. Rev. 597, 602 (1984).
The House of Lords held that by -virtue of section 13(5) of the State Immunities Act
the head of the mission's certificate that property is not in use or intended for commer-
cial purposes is sufficient evidence of that fact unless the contrary is proved. The Co-
lombian Ambassador had issued just such a certificate. Alcom, [1984] App. Cas. at 604.
Since the judgment creditor had failed to disprove the certificate, the Republic of Co-
lombia was deemed entitled to succeed in its appeal. Id. at 605.
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The House of Lords noted, however, that Britain's counterpart to
the FSIA, the State Immunities Act (SIA),3 3 "does not adopt the
straightforward dichotomy between acta jure imperii and acta jure
gestionis that had become familiar doctrine in public international
law."134 The SIA creates individual exceptions to immunity 135 and
makes a clear distinction between jurisdictional and executional immu-
nity. This separates the SIA from the FSIA.' 36
The West German Federal Constitutional Court similarly found
that embassy bank accounts were immune from execution in West Ger-
man courts.137 After a brief survey of the way the international commu-
nity has handled executional immunity, the court stated that, while the
"general rules of international law thus impose no outright prohibition
on execution by the State of the forum against a foreign State, they do
impose material limits on execution."' 3 The court concluded that an
account whose purpose was "to cover the embassy's costs and expenses"
was exempt from execution."' West German courts have also found a
... 1978, ch. 33.
134 Alcom, [1984] App. Cas. at 600 ("... except that it comes close to doing so in
section 14(2) in relation to the immunity conferred upon 'separate entities that are
emanations of the state'.") (italics added in text).
135 Id. The British courts, for instance, have not allowed sovereign immunity for
an action involving repairs to an ambassador's residence. Planmount v. Republic of
Zaire, [19801 2 Lloyd's Rep. 393, 396.
136 Hazel Fox stated that
[t]he identification of State property liable to attachment is clearly made
by the [British] 1978 Act a purposive one . . . It is to be noted that the
U.S. Act has not adopted this approach but merely provides two lists, one
of special occasions on which, despite the general prohibition, state prop-
erty may be attached, and the other of certain types of property always
immune from execution.
Fox, supra note 44, at 125.
137 In West Germany, international law forms part of the domestic law. Basic
Law, art. 25, first sentence; Act concerning the Federal Constitutional Court, art. 83
(I), cited in Philippine Embassy Case, supra note 123, at 320.
138 Philippine Embassy Case, supra note 123, at 320-21. The court went on to
point out that the general rule is that the agreement is that
property in the State of the forum which is used for sovereign purposes of
the foreign State is not subject to execution. Occasional doubts - such as
those which are mentioned in the statement of position by the Federal
Government concerning the levying of execution on embassy accounts, but
which the Federal Government itself does not share - cannot alter the fact
that a general rule of international law does exist on that point. State
practice, as evidenced in treaty practice, in legislation and in the decisions
of national courts, and the international law literature are unanimous on
this question . ...
Id.
"' The full text of the court's statement is:
Forced execution of judgment by the state of the forum under a writ of
execution by a foreign State which has been issued in respect of non-sover-
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sharp distinction between jurisdictional immunity and executional
immunity. 40
An Austrian court, on the other hand, has held that there should
be some room for a court to examine the use of the account in deter-
mining whether an embassy account should be immune. In Neustein v.
Republic of Indonesia, the court determined that the judiciary should
examine whether or not the assets "serv[ed] private law purposes."' "" It
apparently required that the assets must exclusively serve sovereign
purposes to be immune. 42
The differing treatment of embassy bank accounts by the United
States, Great Britain, West Germany and Austria, shows the lack of
consensus, even among nations following the restrictive immunity doc-
trine, regarding immunity from execution on "mixed" embassy ac-
counts. There does appear to be a minimal level of executional immu-
nity which has been established in international law: an account
exclusively serving sovereign or diplomatic functions must be immune
from execution. Each nation seems to have developed its own standard
of how much "commercialization" shall be allowed in an account
before it loses that immunity. Thus, international law should not pre-
vent a United States court from adopting the new standard proposed
below."'
eign acts (acta jure gestionis) of that State, on property of that State
which is present or situated in the territory of the State of the forum is
inadmissible without the consent of the foreign State if, at the time of the
initiation of the measure of execution, such property serves sovereign pur-
poses of the foreign State. Claims against a general current bank account
of the embassy of the foreign state which exists in the state of the forum
and the purpose of which is to cover the embassy's costs and expenses are
not subject to forced execution by the State of the forum. This rule forms
part of the federal law.
Id. at 300.
140 See Judgment of April 30, 1963, Bundesverwaltungsgericht, W. Ger., 16
BVerwG 27 in United Nations Materials, supra note 43, at 282, where, as Britain did
in Planmount v. Republic of Zaire, [19801 2 Lloyd's Rep. 393, the Court denied juris-
dictional immunity for repairs to the ambassador's residence.
141 Fox, supra note 44, at 117 n.7, citing Neustein v. Republic of Indonesia, un-
published decision of 6 Aug. 1958, reported in SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, FESTSCHRIFT
G. BEITKE, 1081, 1098 (1979); 10 NETH. Y.B. INT'L. L. 107 (1979).
142 Id.
143 A British court thought that a change in interpretation of international law
could be made by a lower court. The opinion stated:
I see no reason why we should wait for the House of Lords to make the
change. After all, we are not considering here the rules of English law on
which the House has the final say. We are [interpreting] the rules of in-
ternational law. We can and should state our view as to those rules and
apply them as we think best, leaving it to the House to reverse us if we
are wrong.
Trendtex, [1977] Q.B. at 557.
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4. FINDING NEW STANDARD
4.1. The Problem with the Present Standard
There are three major problems with the LETCO approach to em-
bassy bank account immunity. First, those who conduct business with
an embassy presently have no assurance that their debts will be satis-
fied. This may hinder an embassy's ability to purchase basic services
and hinder a creditor's ability to satisfy her debts. Second, the LETCO
approach allows the foreign government to mix its non-embassy-related
commercial funds with its diplomatic funds. This allows the foreign
government to conduct commercial activity in this country with immu-
nity by transacting business through the embassy. 4 4 Finally, LETCO
imposes a second obstacle for the judgment creditor to overcome when
the foreign government has already consented to suit concerning a given
activity. This may leave a creditor who thought she could get satisfac-
tion in the United States courts unable to do so.
The restrictive theory of sovereign immunity balances two conflict-
ing interests: those of individuals doing business with foreign sovereigns
who wish to enforce their contracts in court, and those of foreign gov-
ernments who desire to perform political acts without the embarrass-
ment or hindrance of defending those actions in foreign courts.14 5 When
one cannot execute a judgment, however, the foreign government has
already gone through the "embarrassment and hindrance" of defending
its action in court, but has not given individuals any redress there.
"[W]hile an unenforceable judgment is not wholly useless, since it may
act as a vehicle for moral suasion or as a springboard for settlement
negotiations,"1 4 it ignores the policy behind the restrictive doctrine to
allow stronger executional immunity than jurisdictional immunity.
Executional immunity, however, also serves diplomatic immunity
purposes by providing a kind of bankruptcy protection for the embassy.
The domestic bankruptcy law of the United States reflects a public pol-
icy requirement that individual debtors be able to retain certain mini-
mal possessions, even at the price of full satisfaction for creditors. Simi-
larly, limited diplomatic immunity allows an embassy to retain certain
minimal diplomatic property in the interest of diplomatic relations.
In the United States, the FSIA represents a clear mandate that the
144 This is necessary because the ambassador's affidavit is the last word on the use
of the embassy funds. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
145 Victory Transport v. Comisaria General, 336 F.2d 354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964).
146 Note, Sovereign Immunity of States Engaged in Commercial Activities, 65
COLUM. L. REv. 1086, 1095 (1965).
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statute 147 should have some role in determining sovereign immunity.
The statute itself, however, leaves considerable discretion to the courts
in clarifying the immunities exceptions.'4 This is particularly true
where diplomatic immunities and sovereign immunities are involved, as
the FSIA does not address diplomatic immunity.'49 Therefore, new
"Tate Letters" clarifying immunities exceptions can come out of
United States courts, rather than from the State Department.
4.2. A Proposal
United States courts should apply a new standard to give the com-
mercial embassy bank account execution exception to sovereign immu-
nity more consistency with the sovereign immunity in other areas,
while taking into account the diplomatic functions at stake. This Com-
ment proposes a standard that (1) makes the embassy liable for the
embassy's peculiar debts, rather than for the debts its government may
have incurred in other contexts, and (2) eliminates an embassy ac-
count's executional immunity altogether if the creditor can show that
the embassy has conducted business for the country's commercial enter-
prises in the United States.
Other commentators have dealt generally with the problem of exe-
cuting judgments against foreign states. James Crawford has suggested
immunizing embassy bank accounts and other limited property on the
basis of diplomatic immunity, while allowing broad immunity for other
types of property.' Specific criteria would be set aside for each "class"
of activity, rather than a general "commercial activity" exception, as in
the FSIA. 5' He suggests alternatively that foreign states voluntarily
147 Therefore, Congress' role increased while the executive branch's role
decreased.
148 For instance, the legislative history to the act says:
The language 'is or was used' in paragraph (2) contemplates a situation
where property may be transferred from the commercial activity which is
the subject of the suit in an effort to avoid the process of the court. This
language, however, does not bear on the question of whether particular
property is to be deemed property of the entity against which the judg-
ment was obtained. The courts will have to determine whether property
'in the custody of' an agency or instrumentality is property 'of' the agency
or instrumentality, whether property held by one agency should be
deemed to be property of another, whether property held by an agency is
property of the foreign state.
H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6627.
149 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
150 Crawford, supra note 124, at 117.
181 See generally Crawford, Execution of Judgments and Foreign Sovereign Im-
munity, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 821 (1981). Note, however, that Crawford's approach
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undertake to pay all debts in which there is no question of immunity,
while getting broad immunity protection in return. 5 ' Thomas Hill has
argued similarly that, by protecting certain vital state property from
execution, execution on other property can be made easier.' 53
Execution on embassy bank accounts, however, causes a unique
problem. The diplomatic character of such accounts must generally be
respected if international relations are to function smoothly. Funds in
an account in the name of the embassy that is not used for diplomatic
purposes, however, have no diplomatic character. The money in such
accounts is not diplomatically sensitive. Yet the account is fluid, and the
government can keep as much money in it as it wants. Such accounts
are subject to abuse. As long as diplomatic and other sovereign uses of
the account are protected and discovery into sensitive areas is prohib-
ited, the purpose of diplomatic immunity is secure.
In passing the FSIA, Congress wanted to provide some redress for
those who engage in commercial activity with a foreign government."'
Those creditors who would expect, in the absence of litigation, to be
paid out of the embassy's bank accounts should have redress against
those bank accounts. Such creditors would normally fall into two
groups: (1) those who engage in business with the embassy as an em-
bassy, rather than the foreign government generally, and (2) those who
engage in commercial activities with an embassy whose "business" ex-
tends beyond providing for items and people within the embassy's
walls.
Once a person has engaged in a commercial activity with a foreign
embassy, she can reasonably expect to be paid out of the embassy bank
account. Activity in this area includes, for example, food deliveries to
the embassies, entertainment, and salaries of American staff working at
the embassy. For these activities, the money in the embassy bank ac-
count would normally be used to satisfy the embassy's debts. A vendor
should not have to look for other assets of the foreign government in the
United States in order to secure payment for her services. Diplomatic
immunity, in fact, is designed to protect the continuance of these types
of services.
By contrast, in a case where a bank loans money to a foreign gov-
probably could not be completely adopted in the United States without a change in the
FSIA, which embraces the "commercial activities" classification. It may be more appli-
cable where diplomatic immunities are involved.
,"2 Crawford, supra note 124, at 117.
183 Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 236 (1981).
I" H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6604, 6605.
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ernment, the bank generally transacts with the foreign government.
The bank should look for assets beyond the embassy, and in some cases
outside the United States, in order to secure the loan. If execution on
embassy accounts is permitted for such creditors, a government that
finds itself in general financial trouble will have its embassy accounts
eternally tied up because of the country's general debts. This hinders
diplomatic relations. The proposed scheme allows some security for
those transacting with the embassy, so that the embassy's diplomatic
transactions may continue.
This result would be consistent with sovereign immunity princi-
ples, particularly the FSIA's standard provision that execution may be
had if "the property is or was used for the commercial activity upon
which the claim is based. 11 55 Even in LETCO, the court conceded that
the bank accounts were used for some "commercial activities" within
the meaning that Congress envisioned,' 56 although those activities were
not the basis of the judgment. Thus, it is logical that the embassy
should be held responsible for the "commercial activities" that it under-
takes. "Commercial activities" in this area would not, however, make
the account generally subject to execution for any debts that the govern-
ment might incur. This scheme would make the executional rules on
embassy bank accounts similar to the rules already in effect concerning
execution on state-owned ships. 5
The other instance in which the proposed approach would require
execution on an embassy bank account is when the account is used for
commercial activities that extend beyond the normal diplomatic func-
tions of an embassy. Execution would require more than that the em-
bassy engaged in "commercial activities" within the meaning of the
FSIA, because every embassy engages to some extent in activities such
as contracts with caterers. When an embassy account is used for such
purposes, it should lose its executional immunity for all claims in which
jurisdictional immunity has been waived.
The LETCO court's standard of exempting whole bank accounts
used for "commercial activities which are 'incidental' or 'auxiliary,' not
denoting the essential character of the funds in question,"'' 5  would
155 FSIA, 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1982).
156 The court presumes that some portion of the funds in the bank accounts
may be used for commercial activities in connection with running the Em-
bassy, such as transactions to purchase goods or services from private enti-
ties. The legislative history of the FSIA indicates that these funds would
be used for a commercial activity and not be immune from attachment.
LETCO, 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1987).
17 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
18 LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610.
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tend to exempt almost every embassy account. The court seemed to be
worried that diplomats would have difficulty separating the public from
the non-public purposes of the accounts."' 9 Under the court's scheme,
however, the only way an account would be liable to any execution
would be if the embassy separated its accounts from those of its com-
mercial enterprises.
Under the proposed standard, embassy activity would be more dis-
tinguishable from non-embassy activity than the "commercial/non-
commercial" distinction advanced under the LETCO scheme.
The proposed standard also addresses diplomatic immunity. The
LETCO rule was formulated in large part to address the problem of
discovery in determining the uses of the embassy account.160 Nothing in
the Vienna Convention explicitly grants all embassy accounts immunity
from execution.'16 Discovery problems are basically eliminated under
the proposed standard, because it is not necessary to prove every use of
the account. Instead, a creditor may rely on particularly egregious ex-
amples of non-embassy activity for which the account had been used.
The creditor could be restricted from subpoenaing the information di-
rectly from the embassy.
Under this proposed standard, it is likely that neither the accounts
at issue in Birch nor in LETCO would be subject to execution. LETCO
is the easier case. There, the accounts belonged to the Liberian Em-
bassy in the United States, while the claim concerned a French com-
pany's transaction with the Liberian government in Liberia.' 62 This is
not the type of transaction which the account was designed to cover.
The only question left under the proposed standard would be whether
or not the Liberian embassy's account went beyond the normal scope of
diplomatic activity. There is no indication in the decision that it did;'
the account would therefore remain immune.
In Birch, the court focused on criteria that did not concern the
foreign government's diplomatic immunity. Because the transaction was
financed by the United States Department of Agriculture, it is possible
that the embassy bank account was used as a conduit between
Tanzania and the shipowner. It is possible that the shipowner had rea-
169 Id.
160 The LETCO court felt that it had to accept the ambassador's characterization
of the use of the account, rather than try to decipher what the overall use of the account
was. LETCO, 659 F. Supp. at 610.
161 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
162 See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
... There is not enough information in the published opinion to determine
whether or not this is the case. This is understandable because the focus in the LETCO
standard is different from the present standard.
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son to expect to be paid out of the embassy funds. The court could also
ask whether the account was being used for non-embassy-related debts.
Instead, the court focused upon the fact that, according to the ambassa-
dor's affidavit, the embassy account was being used for "commercial
activities" such as paying salaries of American embassy personnel. The
Birch standard makes the embassy account as liable to attachment for
the embassy's own debts as for any debts that its government incurred
around the world." This standard also arguably would make virtually
every embassy account liable to execution 5
A more dramatic example of the difference between the proposed
standard and the LETCO standard is how each would apply to a future
Transamerican Steamship judgment.'66 The Transamerican Steam-
ship court said that the embassy had waived jurisdictional immunity
because it exceeded the realm of ordinary embassy behavior.' 67 Hence,
it would seem reasonable that the embassy would also lose its immunity
from execution. Under the proposed standard, an account so tainted
would lose its status as an immune account as to any claims validly
adjudicated.' 8 Under the LETCO standard, an account could have only
one "essential character." Thus, if the embassy used this account for
such non-immune transactions, but other uses of the account
predominated, the whole account would remain immune. The LETCO
court said that "requiring diplomats to segregate funds of a public
character from commercial activity funds [to avoid the risk of attach-
ment] is not the solution" because of the difficulty that the courts have
had in doing so.' 9 The proposed standard would not necessitate such a
difficult segregation; it would merely require a separation of embassy
activity funds from other funds.
The proof necessary for determining immunity would also differ
under the present and proposed standards. The LETCO standard relies
heavily on an ambassador's certification of the account's use in deter-
mining the essential purpose. This is necessary because courts would
164 I do not see anything wrong with holding an embassy liable in those cases
where it chooses to exceed the legitimate boundaries of an embassy. Such an embassy
essentially makes a conscious choice to waive its rights, assuming it knows of the pro-
posed standard.
165 Congress' definition of "commercial activity" includes ordinary embassy trans-
actions. See supra note 34.
16 See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
167 See supra note 64.
16 It should also be noted that one would expect to be paid out of the embassy
account for this transaction. It does not appear, however, that this is the type of trans-
action for which an embassy normally pays, and thus it would fall under the second
half of the proposed immunity exception criteria.
169 659 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D.D.C. 1987).
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presumably require a considerable history of commercial expense to
overcome the embassy account's presumption of immunity. Where a
creditor tries to demonstrate a general "waiver" of the use of the ac-
count, the proposed standard could rely on one particularly egregious
example of a use of the account for non-embassy transactions or on a
series of less egregious examples. Where a creditor tries to demonstrate
a No such proof would be needed to execute a judgment on an ordinary
embassy transaction. To overcome the standards of proof necessary to
show non-immunity, therefore, less of an intrusion into the embassy's
records would be necessary to show the non-immunity of the account.
This is the type of diplomatic immunity that the Vienna Convention
specifically protects.
5. CONCLUSION
The proposed standard for determining the sovereign and diplo-
matic immunity of embassy bank accounts would make it possible to
execute on accounts which are "fronts" for government commercial ac-
tivities and would allow creditors to collect on those debts which the
account would normally pay in the absence of litigation. The account
would remain immune and the embassy free from discovery otherwise.
Much of the problem that has arisen regarding judicial determina-
tion of execution on embassy bank accounts stems from attempts to ap-
ply the general theories of sovereign immunity to this area where diplo-
matic immunity is heavily involved. This problem can be solved by
combining the generally determinative "commercial" standard with a
standard which also seeks to protect normal embassy functions.
International law is flexible in this area. Because the restrictive
immunity doctrine's application to embassy bank accounts varies signif-
icantly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, international law does not rule
out a novel approach. The proposed standard offers the courts a rela-
tively simple1"' method of determining the immunity or non-immunity
of the embassy account. This standard extends the spirit, if not the
present interpretation, of the FSIA's commercial activity exception to
embassy bank accounts. It also extends the Vienna Convention's ap-
proach to diplomatic immunities for a diplomat's personal accounts to
the area of embassy accounts, on which the Convention was largely
170 The standard is relatively simple because it does not require extensive discov-
ery, much of which the embassy is exempt from, to determine what the "essential char-
acter" of the account is. Of course, the court would have some flexibility in determining
whether or not the embassy account is overly commercial, but this would require only a
look at specific transactions and would eliminate any discussion about those day-to-day
activities such as the running of the embassy, unless they were the subject of the suit.
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silent. 1 '1 While the approach does not presently reflect the international
practice, no other single approach can claim universal acceptance.
Courts in the United States are left a wide latitude in determining
immunity in this area. The proposed approach would bring some con-
sistency in spirit to an area of immunity that is well behind the devel-
opment of immunity in other areas.
1 See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
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